ABSTRACT. Many cryptographic systems which involve hash functions have proof of their security in a so called random oracle model. Behavior of hash functions used in such cryptographic systems should be as close as possible to the behavior of a random function. There are several properties of hash functions dealing with a random behavior. A hash function is pseudo-random oracle if it is indifferentiable from a random oracle. However, it is well known that hash functions based on the popular Merkle-Damgård domain extension transform do not satisfy the pseudo-random oracle property. On the other hand no attack is known for many concrete applications utilizing Merkle-Damgård hash functions. Hence, a weakened notion called public-use pseudo random oracle was introduced. The property can be met by the Merkle-Damgård construction and is sufficient for several important applications. A hash function is public use pseudo-random oracle if it is indifferentiable from a random oracle with public messages (i.e., all messages hashed so far are available to all parties). This is the case of most hash based signature schemes.
Introduction
The primary security property of cryptographic hash functions has historically been collision resistance. A hash function is collision resistant, if it is hard to find two different messages which hash to the same image. However, collision resistance alone is insufficient for arguing security of many important applications. For some of the applications (e.g., Fiat-Shamir signatures, RSA-FDH) a hash function must have "random behaviour", which is hard (or even impossible) to define in the standard model.
Hence, B e l l a r e and R o g a w a y [4] introduced a so called random oracle model, which models a hash function as a publicly available random function (random oracle). Using this framework, one can prove security of many important schemes. A proof in the random oracle model does not guarantee security when we replace the random oracle with a real hash function [6] . However, such a proof is believed to ensure that there are no structural flaws in the scheme and thus one can heuristically hope that the scheme remains flawless when the random oracle is replaced with a "well designed" hash function.
Cryptographic hash functions are often built using some domain extension transform (e.g., Merkle-Damgård construction [8] , [15] ) from a smaller primitive called compression function. On the other hand, in the random oracle model hash functions are modeled as monolithic random function without any subcomponents. Hence, C o r o n et al. [7] introduced a pseudo-random oracle property, which models a hash function as a function constructed by a domain extension transform from a fixed input length random oracle. A domain extension transform is pseudo-random oracle (pro) if it securely extends domain of an ideal compression function (i.e., fixed-input length random oracle) to a variable input length random oracle. The property is based on the indifferentiability framework [14] . Similarly to the random oracle model, the pseudo-random oracle property does not guarantee security when we replace ideal compression function with a real one. On the other hand, one can heuristically hope that if the real compression function is well designed, then also the resulting hash function is "good".
As it is shown in [7] , the (strengthened) Merkle-Damgård construction [8] , [15] is not pseudo-random oracle. However, still many applications utilize hash functions based on the Merkle-Damgård construction, but no practical attacks against these applications have been found. This leads to a disconnection between theory and practice. D o d i s, R i s t e n p a r t and S h r i m p t o n [9] presented a weaker security notion than the pseudo-random oracle called public use pseudo-random oracle (pub-pro). The property pub-pro is sufficient for arguing security of important applications (e.g., hash based digital signature schemes) and yet is met by the Merkle-Damgård transformation.
The property pub-pro guarantees security (in the random oracle model) of applications, which never evaluate hashes on secret inputs. That is, all messages (and thus corresponding images) evaluated so far are public and accessible to all adversaries. For example, this is the case of most of hash-based digital signature schemes. On the contrary, the pro property keeps all evaluated messages secret.
It is clear that the pro property is stronger than pub-pro, i.e., if a domain extension transform is pro, then it is pub-pro. The opposite direction does not hold, for example the Merkle-Damgård domain extension transform is pub-pro, but not pro [9] . 
Preliminaries

Interactive boolean circuits
A boolean circuit (definition is from [11] ) is a directed acyclic graph without isolated vertices. There are three types of vertices: sources, sinks and internal vertices.
• Internal vertices are vertices having incoming and outgoing edges (i.e., they have in-degree and out-degree at least 1 An interactive boolean circuit (IBC) C is a boolean circuit with special oracle gates. The IBC C can communicate with other IBCs C 1 , . . . , C n via the oracle gates. Each oracle gate is labeled by a name of an IBC (i.e., if C has access to IBCs C 1 , . . . , C n , then the gates's label is one of C 1 , . . . , C n ). If an oracle gate has label C i , we say that the oracle gate is of type C i . Each input edge to an oracle gate is labeled with a natural number 1, . . . , m, where m is in-degree of the oracle gate. We disallow the same labels for different input edges. An input edge to an oracle gate of type C i with label j represents jth input bit to the IBC C i . Output edges of an oracle gate are also labeled with a natural number 1, 2, . . . , y. Same labels for different output edges are allowed. An output edge from the gate of type C i with label j represents jth output bit of the IBC C i .
Whenever computation reaches an oracle gate G of type C i , the IBC C i is invoked on the input of G and output of C i is passed to the output of G. We call such an operation a query to the oracle C i . By C C 1 ,...,C n we denote that C contains oracle gates of type C 1 , . . . , C n .
Each IBC can implement various interfaces (t 1 , t 2 , . . . ). An interface specifies what needs to be given on the input to an oracle gate to invoke particular functionality of the IBC. We write C = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . ) meaning that C implements interfaces t 1 , t 2 , . . . (For example, an interface can specify that if the first input bit is 0, then a functionality t 1 is invoked. If the first bit is 1 then a functionality t 2 is invoked.)
We sometimes distinguish between private and public interfaces of an IBC C. In this case we write C = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . ), (t 1 , t 2 , . . . ) , where t 1 , t 2 , . . . are private interfaces and t 1 , t 2 , . . . are public. We write P C pub to denote that an IBC P has oracle access only to public interfaces of an IBC C. Similarly, by P C priv we denote the fact that P has access only to private interfaces of C. Evaluation order. Note that since an IBC C can contain oracle gates, the output of C can depend on the order of evaluation of some oracle gates (which are not connected by a path). By C E we denote an evaluation of C with the specified order E. In most cases we omit to specify the evaluation order of some IBC C. It means that the corresponding discussion holds for any evaluation order of the IBC C.
Domain extension transform. Let n ∈ N be a security parameter. A domain extension transform (DET) H is an IBC, the size of which is polynomial in n with oracle access to a function f : {0, 1}
y+d → {0, 1} y , where d, y ∈ N are polynomially related to the security parameter n (i.e., d = p 1 (n) and y = p 2 (n) for some polynomials p 1 , p 2 ). The function f is called compression function.
Distinguisher. A distinguisher D is an IBC with one output bit. Besides standard input, D can contain several random input bits, which are initialized with value uniformly chosen from {0, 1}.
Merkle-Damgård construction
Let Y 0 = IV be some constant initialization vector from the set {0, 1}
y . The strengthened Merkle-Damgård (SMD) domain extension transform operates in the following way (see Figure 1 ).
Algorithm SMD
f (M ) the algorithm has oracle access to f : {0,
By SMD f we denote the hash function family created by the SMD domain extension transform from the compression function f : {0,
The key security feature of the MD construction is that it preserves collision resistance. If the compression function f is collision resistant, then so is the resulting hash function SMD f [8] , [15] .
Pseudo-random oracles
Pseudo-random oracle
Pseudo-random oracle (pro) [2] , [3] , [7] is a property of domain extension transforms for cryptographic hash functions based on the indifferentiability framework [14] . A hash function H f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} y based on an ideal compression function f (i.e., fixed input length (FIL) random oracle) is pseudorandom oracle if it is indifferentiable from a variable input length (VIL) random oracle.
Let H be a domain extension transform, D be a distinguisher and S a simulator. We define the following pro advantage:
We say that the domain extension transform H is pro if there exists a polynomial simulator S such that for any polynomial distinguisher D there is a negligible function negl such that Adv pro H,S (D) ≤ negl(n). The pseudo-random oracle property is meaningful only in the random-oracle model. Since H is based on an "uncertain" random compression function f, the pro is rather a property of domain extension transforms. Thus H securely extends the domain of the fixed-input length random oracle f to the variableinput length pseudo-random oracle.
Strong vs. weak indifferentiability. Note that there are two different definitions of pseudo-random oracle. M a u r e r et al. [14] used a different quantifier ordering. Their definition said that for all efficient distinguishers D there exists an efficient simulator S such that Adv pro H,S (D) is negligible. We adopt the labeling from [16] where they refer to the notion from [14] as weak indifferentiability and from [7] (which is used in this paper) as strong. It is clear that strong indifferentiability implies weak. In this paper, we restrict our discussion to the strong version of the pseudo-random oracle.
Public use random oracle
Many applications compute hashes only from public messages, i.e., messages that are available to any party and thus any party is able to compute hash of the messages. The security of these applications is not affected when all messages are revealed to adversaries. Important applications of such public use of hash functions are digital signature schemes or even some encryption schemes.
Public use pseudo-random oracle security notion [9] captures such applications. The public use random oracle is an ideal primitive with two interfaces. The first interface is available to all parties and performs the usual evaluation of the random oracle-given a message M it outputs its image Y. The second interface is available only to adversaries (and simulators) and when queried it reveals all evaluated messages and their corresponding images made so far to the first interface.
Let ρ = RF * ,y . Formally, the public use random oracle is an ideal cryptosystem F = (F eval ), (F eval , F reveal ) , where F eval implements the random function ρ and F reveal reveals all queries (messages with their corresponding images) asked to the public interface F eval (see Figure 2) . If ρ is a FIL random function, we say F is a FIL public use random oracle. FIL public use ROs are denoted in lower case, i.e., f := (f eval ), (f eval , f reveal ) . Let RF pub m,y denote the public use random oracle implementing a random function ρ : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} y . D o d i s et al. [9] defined a so called public use pseudo-random oracle property. A hash function H f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} y based on a FIL public use RO f is public use pseudo-random oracle (pub-pro) if it is indifferentiable from a VIL public use random oracle.
Let H be a domain extension transform, D be an adversary and S a simulator implementing two interfaces S eval and S reveal . We define the following pub-pro advantage
We say that the domain extension transform H is pub-pro if there exists a polynomial simulator S such that for any polynomial distinguisher D there is a negligible function negl such that
Public image pseudo-random oracle
The property pub-pro enables simulators to see complete queries (queries and corresponding answers) asked by a distinguisher D to it's first oracle. Due to this fact, the property pub-pro is weaker than pro [9] . When proving indifferentiability of two cryptosystems, to simplify the proof we would like to consider as strongest simulators as possible. Thus, an interesting question is what happens if we allow simulators to see only responses of the D's first oracle.
A public image random oracle is a cryptosystem F = (F eval ), (F eval , F ireveal ) , where F eval implements a random function ρ and F ireveal reveals answers to all queries asked to the public interface F eval . Let RF img m,y denote the public image random oracle implementing a random function ρ :
Ò Ø ÓÒ 1 (img-pro)º Let H be a domain extension transform, D be a distinguisher and S a simulator implementing only one interface. We define the following img-pro advantage
We say that the domain extension transform H is img-pro, if there exists a polynomial simulator S such that for all polynomial distinguishers D there is a negligible function negl such that
Remark 1º
Note that it has no meaning to define img-pro property with f being a FIL public image random oracle, i.e., f = (f eval ), (f eval , f ireveal ) . Since a simulator (which would implement interfaces (S eval ), (S eval , S ireveal ) ) cannot see queries asked by D to it's first oracle (only their responses), the simulator is unable to implement S ireveal consistently.
In Section 4 we show that img-pro is equivalent to pro, i.e., ability to see the list of images, which F eval responds, does not make simulators stronger.
Real vs. random world
The definitions of pro, pub-pro and img-pro are comparing two scenarios. In the first scenario, "real world", the distinguisher has access to a "real" hash function constructed via a domain extension transform from an ideal compression function and to the compression function. In the second scenario, "random world", the distinguisher has access to a (public use/image) random oracle and to a simulator. To shorten our presentation we often write
what means that the probability goes over random selection of the FIL random oracle f and random coins of D. Similarly, we write
what means that the probability goes over random selection of the VIL random oracle F and random coins of D and S.
The pro, pub-pro and img-pro distinguisher D can contain two types of oracle gates. We refer to the gates corresponding to the D's first oracle (H f in the real world, F in the random world) as to F -gates. Similarly, by f -gates we denote gates corresponding to the D's second oracle (f in the real world and S F in the random world).
To denote a particular F -gate we use upper case letters, i.e., G. When considering an f -gate we use lower case, i.e., g.
To differentiate between different types of simulators we use the following notation. A pro simulator is a simulator with access to an oracle, which implements a VIL random oracle. Similarly, a pub-pro simulator has oracle access to VIL public use random oracle and img-pro simulator's oracle is VIL public image random oracle.
Pro is equivalent to img-pro
It is easy to see that if a domain extension transform H is pro, then it is img-pro. If there exists a pro simulator S pro such that for all pro distinguishers D is Adv
then there exists an img-pro simulator S ipro such that for all img-pro distinguishers D is Adv
The simulator S ipro does the same as S pro (it's possible, since S ipro has access to all oracles to which S pro has access). Hence, we can state the following theorem.
Ì ÓÖ Ñ 1º Let H be a domain extension transform which is pro. Then H is img-pro.
The opposite direction is more involved, because of the following problem. Let S ipro be an img-pro simulator and D be a distinguisher for S ipro . Since S ipro can see answers of queries asked by D to it's first oracle, D can pass some information to S ipro , which no pro simulator S pro can see. For example, consider the extension attack, which proves that the Merkle-Damgård domain extension transform [8] , [15] is not pro. Let D be the following distinguisher (see Figure 3 Figure 3 (b)), since no img-pro simulator is able to guess the message M . In the rest of this section we prove that if a domain extension transform is img-pro, then it is also pro.
Distinguisher D
To simplify our proof, we restrict the set of domain extension transforms. We focus only on those transforms, whose output is equal to the output of one of the containing oracle gates. This restriction avoids problems with "partially instantiated" transforms [10] , which instantiate several oracle gates with some real compression function.
Ò Ø ÓÒ 2 (Standard DET)º Let H be a domain extension transform.
We say H is standard if value of H f (M ) is equal to the output of one of the containing f -gates g. We call such a gate g final.
Note that most of the popular domain extension transforms (e.g., MD [8] , [15] , HMAC [1] , EMD [2] , [3] ) are standard.
Ò Ø ÓÒ 3 (Oracle-oracle output bit)º Let D be a distinguisher in pro sense.
Let G be an oracle gate in D. We say that ith output bit of the gate G is oracleoracle output bit if there exists a path in D starting at the ith output bit of the gate G and ending at some oracle gate G .
In the following definition we formally define the term "minimal" distinguisher (in the pro sense). The minimal distinguisher represents the minimal algorithm (i.e., an algorithm without any "unnecessary" computation), which is able to distinguish between real and random worlds. The minimal distinguisher is defined for a domain extension transform H and a pro simulator S. Note that a minimal distinguisher against some simulator S and a domain extension transform H has non-negligible advantage in pro sense.
In the following two simple lemmas we show that a minimal distinguisher D cannot contain gates which have the same input only in the real world. We show that if two gates have the same input in the real world then almost certainly they have the same input in the random world also. Moreover, in the Lemma 2 we show that a minimal distinguisher gains non-negligible advantage only when all gates have different input. 
However
This completes the first part of the proof. If the gates G 1 and G 2 are F -gates, then in the random world the gates represent an uniform VIL random function F. Thus there exists a negligible function negl 2 such that
Hence, by equations (1) and (2) we have
If the gates G 1 and G 2 are f -gates, then in the real world they represent FIL random function f. Hence, there exits a negligible function negl 3 such that
By combining equations (1) and (3) we have
This completes the second part of the proof. 
Moreover, there exists a negligible function negl 2 such that
P r o o f. Let G 1 and G 2 be two oracle gates in D. Without loss of generality we can assume that there does not exist a path from G 1 to G 2 (since a path between G 1 and G 2 can exist only in one direction). Consider a distinguisher D 2 ( Figure 5 ) which is the same as D but all edges starting at the gate G 1 are redirected such that they start at the gate G 2 and the gate G 1 is removed. Moreover, the distinguisher D 2 compares input to the removed gate G 1 with 
Since D 2 is smaller than D, from the assumption that D is minimal there exists a negligible function negl 1 such that
This completes the first part of the proof. The second part of the proof comes from the fact that if the gates G 1 and G 2 are of the same type and they have the same output, then except the negligible probability they have the same input also (see also discussion in the previous lemma). Hence, there exists a negligible function negl 2 such that
Thus,
A gate G in a distinguisher D is end gate if all paths from G to the output bit do not contain oracle gates. Let L(D) = {G 1 , . . . , G l } denote the set of all end gates in D. In the following lemmas we prove an intuitive fact, that if a domain extension transform H is pub-pro then the only chance how a distinguisher D can distinguish between real and random worlds is to compute the hash of some message M in two different ways. Moreover, a simulator must be unable to obtain the message M .
We start by two lemmas, which state that there is at least one f -gate and one F -gate in the set of end gates in a minimal distinguisher D. If DI does not hold for some evaluation of D, then there exist at least two gates with the same input-we can apply the construction of a smaller distinguisher D 2 from Lemma 2. Hence, there exists a negligible function negl 1 such that
Ä ÑÑ 3º Let H be a standard domain extension transform which is not pro and S be a simulator which output is indistinguishable from a random function. Let D be a minimal distinguisher against S and H. Then there exists an F-gate G ∈ L(D).
Similarly, we can apply the construction D 1 from Lemma 1. Thus there exists a negligible function negl 2 such that
Now consider D's advantage against the simulator S and the domain extension transform H
Adv pro S,H (D) = Pr H,f,D [D H f ,f → 1|DI] · Pr H,f,D [DI] − Pr F,S,D D F,S F → 1|DI · Pr F,S,D [DI] + Pr H,f,D [D H f ,f → 1 ∧ ¬DI] − Pr F,S,D D F,S F → 1 ∧ ¬DI ≤ (1 − α) Pr H,f,D D H f ,f → 1|DI − (1 − α) · Pr F,S,D D F,S F → 1|DI + negl 1 (n) + negl 2 (n) ≤ (1 − α) · Pr H,f,D D H f ,f → 1|DI − Pr F,S,D D F,S F → 1|DI + negl 1 (n) + negl 2 (n).
If all gates in L(D) have different input, the distribution of output of gates in L(D)
is the same in both worlds. In the real world, all gates in L(D) correspond to the FIL random function f. In the random world, gates from L(D) corresponds to the simulator, which output is indistinguishable from a random function. Hence, there exists a negligible function negl 3 such that
. This contradicts the minimality of D.
Ä ÑÑ 4º Let H be a standard domain extension transform which is pub-pro,
S be a pro simulator for H and D be a minimal distinguisher against S. Then there exists an f -gate g ∈ L(D).
P r o o f. Assume the contrary that all gates in L(D) are F -gates. Let DI denote the event that during some evaluation of D all gates in L(D) have different input.
ON PSEUDO-RANDOM ORACLES
By Lemmas 1 and 2 there exist negligible functions negl 1 and negl 2 such that (see also proof of the previous lemma for more detailed discussion)
Note that for the domain extension transform H, the simulator S, and the minimal distinguisher D, the probabilities
are fixed. Hence, there exists the following distinguisher D in pub-pro sense:
Let S be some pub-pro simulator and consider the advantage of D against the simulator S . To shorten our presentation, let 
We have
Note that from the definition of the distinguisher D we have that the probabilities 
ON PSEUDO-RANDOM ORACLES
All three expressions in brackets in the equation above are negative. Hence,
In this case, all three expressions in brackets are non-negative, thus
By combining inequalities (6), (7) and (8) we have
S,H (D). This contradicts the assumption that H is pub-pro.
The following key lemma states that the set L(D) of end gates of any minimal distinguisher for some "reasonable" simulator must contain exactly one f -gate and one F -gate. Moreover, the simulator is unable to query a message on input to the F -gate.
Let S be some pro simulator, D be a distinguisher and let G 1 and G 2 be two oracle gates (of arbitrary type) in the distinguisher D. By EqO(G 1 , G 2 ) we denote an event that the gates G 1 and G 2 have the same output in some computation of D.
Fix some evaluation order of D. Let G be an F -gate in D and g be an f -gate .  Let g 1 , . . . , g l be f -gates evaluated before the gate g. By Que G (g) we denote the event that during some computation of D in the random world, the simulator S during evaluation of gates g 1 , . . . , g l , g asks it is oracle the same query as is the input to the gate G.
Ä ÑÑ 5º Let H be a standard domain extension transform which is pub-pro,
S be a pro simulator for H given by lemma 3 and D be a minimal distinguisher against S. Then there exists an
and a negligible function negl such that Since D is minimal, there must exist a negligible function negl 1 such that for all D's F -gates G different from G holds
Moreover, L(D)
Otherwise we could construct a smaller distinguisher D 3 (see Figure 6 ) which would check the equality of outputs of G and g (D 3 would be without the gate G). Moreover, there must exist a negligible function negl 2 such that for all oracle gates G holds
Otherwise we could construct a smaller distinguisher D 4 (see Figure 7 ) which would replace output of g with output of G . The gate g is then removed from the distinguisher D 4 . Note that since g ∈ L(D) there cannot be a path from the gate g to the gate G . Let G 1 , . . . , G k be all oracle gates in D except the gate g, where G k denotes the gate G. We have
Now we prove the following three statements.
• By inequalities (9) and (10), the last absolute value in inequality (11) must be negligible. That is, there exists a negligible function negl 3 such that
• By equation (10) we have
Let α denote the probability α :
• Since D is minimal, there must exist a negligible function negl 4 such that
Otherwise we could construct a smaller distinguisher D such that g would be replaced by a random string. Since g ∈ L(D) and H is standard, if output of the gate g is different from all of the other gates, then it is distribution cannot be distinguished from a distribution of a random string. This holds in both real and random worlds (otherwise we could construct another smaller distinguisher D which would check the distribution of g and would be without the gate G k ). Let β temporarily denote the prob-
) . We can rewrite the above inequality as
Using inequalities (12) , (13) and (14), the inequality (11) can be rewritten as follows
Consider the probability
Similar equality holds for the random world, i.e.,
By similar construction as the construction D 3 in the equation (9) we have:
Thus we can rewrite the inequality (15)
Now consider the random-world scenario. The simulator S can guess output of the gate G k with non-negligible probability only if it asks its oracle the same query as input to G k . Hence, there exists a negligible function negl such that 
Ì ÓÖ Ñ 2º Let H be a standard domain extension transform which is img-pro,
then H is pro.
P r o o f. Since the pub-pro simulators have all the information as img-pro simulators (and possibly more), it is clear that if H is not pub-pro, then it is not img-pro. Hence, in the rest of this proof we assume that H is pub-pro. Assume the contrary that H is img-pro and not pro. Thus, there exists an img-pro simulator S ipro and a negligible function negl 1 such that for all distinguishers D holds Adv
From the assumption that H is not pro, we have that for all pro simulators S pro there exists a distinguisher D and a non-negligible function ε 1 (n) such that
Assume without loss of generality that S ipro does not ask the same query twice. Moreover, assume that S ipro makes queries to F eval as soon as possible. That is, let S be some img-pro simulator, D be a distinguisher and E some evaluation order of D . Let g 1 , . . . , g l be all f -gates in D such that g i+1 is evaluated after g i . Consider that during some computation C of D Let S 1 and S 2 be some simulators. Note that the number δ(S 1 ) is smaller than δ(S 2 ) if S 1 asks queries corresponding to a distinguisher's F -gates sooner than S 2 .
Let S pro be the following simulator, which simulates S ipro :
Simulator S F pro (w) The simulator maintains the list L, which contains all answers of the oracle F to queries asked by S pro .
• Simulate S ipro (w) → y.
-When S ipro asks an F eval query M , then S pro queries Y := F (M ), stores Y to the list L and returns Y to S ipro . -When S ipro asks an F ireveal query, then S pro returns the list L to the simulator S ipro .
• Output y.
Let D be a minimal distinguisher against the simulator S pro and H. Let G, g ∈ L(D) be two oracle gates given by Lemma 5, where
Note that the output of the simulator S ipro must be indistinguishable from a random function (otherwise there exists a distinguisher with non-negligible advantage against S ipro ). Hence, also S pro has output indistinguishable from a random function. Thus it's possible to apply Lemma 5.
Consider an evaluation order E of the distinguisher D such that the F -gate G is evaluated after the f -gate g.
If the gate G is the only F -gate in D, then S pro and S ipro have the same advantage against the distinguisher D, i.e., Hence, in this case S pro correctly simulates S ipro . However, this contradicts the assumption that H is img-pro.
Hence, besides the gate G there must exist another F -gate in the distinguisher D . Let G 1 , . . . , G k be all F -gates in D such that for all i = 1, . . . , k the gate G i+1 is evaluated after the gate G i in the evaluation order E (note that the gates G and G k are the same). From the assumption that H is img-pro we have
Let DO denote the event that all gates G 1 , . . . , G k have distinct output. Let AQ denote the event that all gates G 1 , . . . , G k−1 were queried by a simulator, i.e.,
We now show that all three absolute values in the inequality above are negligible. 1. If DO is not true then there exist gates G i , G j , where i < j with the same output. Consider a similar construction to one in Lemma 2. Let D 1 (Figure 8 ) be a distinguisher which is the same as D but all edges starting at the gate G j are redirected such that they start at the gate G i . The gate G j is removed. The distinguisher D 1 outputs 1 if and only if EqO(G, g) and EqI(G i , G j ). From the definition of the distinguisher D 1 we have Since D 1 is smaller than D, from the assumption that D is minimal there exists a negligible function negl 3 such that
If the gates G i and G j have the same output in the random world, then they have the same input also (except some negligible probability). Thus,
The simulator S pro is unable to output the same string as the output from the gate G unless it asks it's oracle the same query as the input to the gate G. Thus,
From the assumption that H is img-pro we have
However, DO is not true if and only if there exist gates
2. Consider the gate G 1 in the distinguisher D. Evaluation of the gate G 1 does not depend on any other F -gate (since it is the first evaluated F -gate in D). Thus, since the δ(S ipro ) is minimal, if in the gate g the simulator S ipro asks the same query as the input to the gate G 1 , then so does S pro (except a negligible probability negl 2 ). Otherwise we could construct a simulator S ipro with smaller δ(S ipro ). Thus, for all f -gates g in D holds
Similarly, consider that the simulator S ipro have already asked queries M i , where M i = Input(G i ), i < j < k. Then the query M j , which is the same as input to the gate G j , can be computed without using the F ireveal oracle. Hence, from the definition of the S pro we have that for all f -gates g and all j = 1, . . . , k holds Pr
Thus, if AQ is true then the simulator S pro has the same view as the simulator S ipro , except the negligible probability negl 2 (n). Therefore, Let D 3 ( Figure 10 ) be a distinguisher, which is the same as D but the input to the gate G i is replaced by a random string. In the random world scenario of the D 3 's advantage against S pro , the output of such a gate cannot be distinguisher from a random string too, hence, 
The probability that S pro asks the same query as the input to the gate G i is always smaller or equal to the probability that the same does S ipro , i.e., 
By using inequalities (16) , (17), (18) and (24) we have ε 1 (n) ≤ 3 · negl 1 (n) + negl 2 (n) + negl 3 (n) + 2 · negl 4 (n). This contradicts the assumption that H is not pro.
In view of Theorems 1 and 2, we can state the following corollary.
ÓÖÓÐÐ ÖÝ 1º Let H be a standard domain extension transform. Then H is pro if and only if H is img-pro.
